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1) Europe in 19411 
 
                                                






2) Partitioned Yugoslavia2 
 
                                                
2 Credit to http://www.srpska-mreza.com/MAPS/Yugoslavia/YU-Nazi-division.jpg&imgrefurl 
*Note that Croatia was a semi-autonomous state ruled by Ante Pavelić and the Fascist Ustaše. The 
primary operations location for both guerilla groups was in Bosnia, but they were both active 
elsewhere as well.  Serbia was under the command of former Serbian General Milan Nedić with 
German supervision.  Dalmatia along the coast, Montenegro, and Albania were all under direct 
Italian military occupation.   
Bosnia 
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Appendix B: Pronunciation Guide 
 




C   ts as in mats 
Č   ch as in charge 
Ć   similar to, but lighter than, č – as in arch  
Dj   g as in George 
G   g as in go 
J   y as in yell 
Lj   li as in million 
Nj   n as in neutral 
S    s as in sink 
Š   sh as in shift 
Z   z as in zodiac 




How, over the course of three years, does a man go from hero to pariah?  How does the champion of a 
nation fall out so far out of favor so quickly, from power to persecution?  World War II in Yugoslavia lasted 
from 1941 until 1944 during which two men, Draža Mihailović and Josip Broz Tito, led separate and often 
conflicting guerilla resistance movements in an effort to liberate a nation from Axis occupation.  Mihailović 
was the hero in the opening years of the war, but, with the subtle blessing of the allies, Tito supplanted 
Mihailović and emerged victorious.  The dynamics at work were significant; it was a conflict of old and new, 
west and east, and even Democracy and Communism.  The specific aspect of this conflict I chose to approach 
was the role of Western involvement in Yugoslavia and what impact that had on the outcome. 
  My topic is not one that had been studied particularly in depth, nor is it for that matter very mainstream in 
nature.  Much of the general historical knowledge today revolves around the major events of the war, events 
like Operation Overlord and Pearl Harbor.  Common knowledge might stretch as far as the campaign against 
Rommel in North Africa or the siege of Stalingrad, but few if any casual observers of the war today are 
familiar with the guerilla conflicts in the Balkans and Eastern Europe as a whole.  The guerilla insurgency in 
Yugoslavia is no exception.  Most historical writing on this subject occurred during the 1950’s, 1960’s and 
1970’s with a brief revival during the civil strife of the 1990’s, and much of this writing focused on the broad 
military implications of the conflict.  The majority of these writers were Mihailović apologists who focused 
exclusively on mustering historical evidence to vindicate a man they considered to be falsely accused and 
executed.   
 I took a different approach.  I did not attempt to either prove or disprove anything about the actual conflict 
on the ground in Yugoslavia.  Instead I chose to focus on how the guerilla conflict was perceived in the West.  
That was quite a broad goal, and I focused it by defining “the West” as Great Britain and the United States and 
gauged perception by first examining the official stance of the national leaders and second examining how this 
was reflected in the press and other generally accessible sources.  My goal was to analyze the change in 
Western Perception from 1941 to 1946 to help explain and outline the contrasting journeys of Draža 
Mihailović and Josip Broz Tito.  I argued that to the casual observer today, World War II in Yugoslavia is not 
a topic of general knowledge, but that was not true during the war.  The press covered the war in extreme detail 
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all over the world and the particularly heroic stories of these two guerilla fighters were quite popular.  They 
inspired books, movies, features in newspapers, and other expressions of popular interest.  This combination of 
popular perception and the stance of the Western governments combine to trace the ebb and flow of the 
successes and eventual fates of Mihailović and Tito.  
 An understanding of the patterns of perception in the region is necessary to better understand how Western 
sources perceived the World War II conflict.  There were a few key influences on how specifically Americans 
perceived the conflict.  The growing anti-Communist sentiment in the United States led to the passage of bills 
like the Smith Act of 1940 that (indirectly and obscurely) permitted prosecution of suspected revolutionary 
Communists and a basal distrust of the Soviets as an ally.  This growing prejudice was applied to Tito and his 
Partisan Communists at times during the war. Tito’s supporters were primarily Croats from the north of 
Yugoslavia and, in the West, the Croats became associated with the quisling Ustaše fascists that ruled Croatia.  
This Croatian prejudice that ran against Tito’s Partisans was coupled with a general recognition of Serbians as 
trusty and hardy people, though perhaps a bit rash and quick to anger.  The positive Western perception of 
Serbia was built during the First World War when the Serbs stood essentially alone in the Balkans against the 
Central Powers.  Maria Todorova’s 1997 study Imagining the Balkans3 traced the development of Western 
perception of the Balkans up to the wars of the 1990’s.  Todorova argued that the term “Balkan” or 
“Balkanization” has long been used in a pejorative fashion, and, whether appropriate or not, this idea was 
applicable to this period.  The Balkans were considered at this point to be a quite violent area, and a critical 
post-war consideration was determining what leader or political situation could help stabilize the Balkans.  To 
understand not only how the wartime conflict developed but how that development shaped the future of post-
war Yugoslavia, we must understand these contextual considerations.  The Western Allies played a critical part 
in this shaping process, and the narrative produced by the Western press allowed a better understanding of the 
eventual successes and failures of Draža Mihailović and Josip Broz Tito as commanders, leaders, and 
international personalities. 
                                                
3 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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I. Introduction 
 On June 10th, 1946, the summer hall at the infantry academy for the army of the People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia at Topčider4 was filling with spectators.  Locals, foreigners, dignitaries, and 
members of the press corps were gathering in this suburb of Belgrade, Yugoslavia to bear witness to 
a treason trial.  Twenty-four men were on trial, some in person and some ex parte.  All these men 
stood accused of treason against their homeland, for making some effort to thwart the people’s 
struggle for independence.   Yugoslavia was a nation still scarred by a war that had ended only a year 
before, but the change in the political 
landscape made the nation 
unrecognizable.  A Communist 
government led by wartime hero Marshal 
Tito had supplanted the monarchy that 
existed before the war.  These alleged 
traitors, it was charged, had obstructed the 
efforts of Tito and his supporters and 
collaborated with the Axis forces that had 
occupied Yugoslavia.  These men came 
from a variety of backgrounds, from the 
Yugoslavian ambassador to the United States to officials in the wartime quisling government in 
Serbia, but all were purported to have engaged in some form or fashion of subversive activities 
during the war.  Though twenty-four men stood trial, the government’s prosecution had a clear, 
primary target.  Dragoljub Mihailović was the leader of one of these wartime subversive 
                                                
4 For aid in pronunciation, see the pronunciation guide preceding the preface. All names and locations are 
presented in Serbo-Croatian with all accompanying diacritic marks.  At times when quotes are presented 
from other sources, names and places may be spelled in such a way as to make Serbo-Croatian stresses and 
accents acceptable to English readers.  All spellings from sources are not disturbed and are presented as 
they appear in the source. 
Figure 1: The defendants, from the stenographic record of the 
trial of Draža Mihailović 
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organizations and allegedly organized collaborative efforts with the occupiers, ethnic cleansings, and 
conducted operations against the Communist party.5   
 The story of Dragoljub (normally shortened to Draža) Mihailović was not as simple as it was 
presented in front of a military tribunal in a show trial – like atmosphere in the summer of 1946.  
Mihailović was a war hero in 1941, but as the years passed, he moved steadily into the growing 
shadow of his rival, Marshal Tito.  Now he stood alone, forsaken and accused of treason by the 
government of the nation he had fought to preserve.  How, then, did Mihailović turn from savior to 
pariah, from hero to traitor?  How did a man, lauded by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill 
during the early years of the war, find himself seemingly left to his fate before a hostile court run by 
the victor of a wartime feud?   
 The Second World War, as its name suggests, was a global conflict that embroiled peoples of 
many races and backgrounds.  The conflict in Yugoslavia, though left out or brushed over in most 
mainstream narrative accounts, was nonetheless a critical part of the war against the Axis and 
representative of the sacrifices made by the occupied peoples in Europe.  These minor conflicts, 
though of less consequence in the larger picture of the war today, were quite well covered by the 
press in the United States and Great Britain during the war.  The conflict in Yugoslavia was no 
exception.  The Western governments played a critical role in the development of the Tito – 
Mihailović wartime conflict because the Western leaders were forced to decide which group to aid 
with military and medical supplies.  Mihailović had the support of the Western leaders from the 
initiation of his operations in April of 1941 until February of 1944 when Churchill made the decision 
to shift his official support to Marshal Tito.   
 How then did this relate to the plight of Mihailović standing before a tribunal in 1946 a year after 
the war’s conclusion?  The decisions of the Western leaders helped to push Tito to the forefront and 
                                                
5 Account taken from Union of Journalists Association of the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Trial of Dragoljub – Draža Mihailović (Belgrade: State Printing House, 1946). 
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eventually allow him to take control in post-war Yugoslavia, but how did the Western public react?  
How did the perception of the guerilla conflict in Yugoslavia change among the peoples of Great 
Britain and the United States and how was this change related to the activities of their leaders?  The 
journey and subsequent fate of Draža Mihailović was tied inexorably to how he was perceived by the 
Western public and their leaders because the powers of the West could provide his soldiers the means 
necessary to gain an edge against their rival.  Whether Tito or Mihailović, whoever emerged on top 
after the war would be in the best position to secure power.  The perception of the peoples of Great 
Britain and the United States and their leaders would serve as a barometer for the success and future 
prospects for the would-be war heroes.  Thus, as German military divisions rolled into Slovenia and 
Croatia from the North in April 1941, the stage was set for what Louis Adamic called a “New Deal,”6 
in Yugoslavia.  The struggle both against enemies at home and for recognition abroad began.  Both 
men were poised to become heroes, but only the victor would have the luxury of writing history.  
II. 1941-1942 in Yugoslavia  
A. Yugoslavia – A Nation in Crisis 
 
 In 1919, the Western allies helped to legitimize and bring together several new nations during 
their post-war meetings and negotiations at the palace of Versailles outside Paris7.  One of these 
nations of political and punitive convenience was Yugoslavia, which literally means “land of the 
south Slavs.”  This nation, forged primarily out of lands taken from the defeated Hungarians, 
Austrians, and the sovereign states of Serbia and Montenegro, struggled to embrace a national 
identity.  The lands of this new Yugoslavia endured centuries of occupation and rule by Ottoman 
Turks and Hungarians before Serbia alone was able to throw off the yoke of foreign rule and 
                                                
6 Louis Adamic, “Mikhailovitch: Balkan Mystery Man,” The Saturday Evening Post, (19 December 1942), 
20. 
7 For an excellent general overview of Yugoslavian history in its entirety, consult John R. Lampe, 
Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  For a 
more specific study of wartime Yugoslavia and Western involvement, consult Walter R. Roberts, Tito, 
Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945  (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973). 
Background information is taken from these sources. 
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Figure 2: http://www.zum.de/histatlas balkans/haxyugoslavia.html 
establish sovereignty in the 19th Century.  These people were asked to forget cultural and ethnic 
differences and form a new government under the Serbian King Aleksander.  Aleksander was a 
member of the Serbian Karađorđevic dynasty, named for Karađorđe, the 18th-19th century Serbian 
revolutionary whose name literally meant “Black George.”  The three major ethnic groups, Slovenes, 
Croats, and Serbs, were unable to successfully rule Yugoslavia in a parliamentary system and, in 
1929, Aleksander dissolved the parliament and established a monarchial and military dictatorship. 
 Aleksander was unpopular, and struggled to lead his young nation through the economic and 
political upheavals of the 1930’s in Europe.  While in Marseilles in 1934, Aleksander was 
assassinated by a Macedonian revolutionary supported by the fascist Croatian Ustaše movement.  His 
brother, Prince Paul, ruled as regent in place of Aleksander’s 11 year old son, Peter.  Hitler began to 
pressure Prince Paul to sign the Tripartite Pact in 1940, and after attempting to avoid any sort of 
formal commitment for over a year, Prince Paul and his military advisors signed a pact of mutual 
cooperation with Hitler on March 25th, 1941.  Two days later, a military coup d’état led by 
Yugoslavian General Dusan Simović 
wrested power away from Prince 
Paul and prepared to resist the 
Germans.  Hitler decided to 
postpone Operation Barbarossa 
against the Soviets.  The Italians 
were struggling to subdue Greek 
resistance and the renewed threat in 
Yugoslavia, however minor was troubling to the German leadership.  The Germans invaded and, by 
April 17th, Yugoslavia had surrendered and was partitioned (see figure 2).  The coastlands of 
Dalmatia and Montenegro fell directly to Italy, and Croatia became a Fascist state under Ante 
Pavelić, returned from exile in Italy, and his Ustaše fascists.  Hitler gave Serbia to another quisling 
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named Milan Nedić, a former Yugoslavian general.  Meanwhile, King Peter, now 18 years old, fled 
first to Cairo and then to London, establishing a government in exile for his beleaguered and broken 
nation. It was in this atmosphere of chaos and confusion within the borders of a divided and 
desperate nation that Draža Mihailović began his journey.  Mihailović fled to Bosnia where he would 
remain for much of the war, and immediately moved to inform his government of his location and his 
intentions to resist the occupiers. 
 In Zagreb, Croatia, Josip Broz had weathered the storm of Nazi invasion in hiding in his 
downtown apartment.  Josip Broz was the chairman and leader of an illegal and secret organization 
known as the CPY, or Communist Party of Yugoslavia.  A machinist by trade, Broz, now 49, had 
spent the majority of his life on the run.  He traveled across Yugoslavia advocating pro-worker 
reform and had consequently spent substantial amounts of time in prison for what was illegal rhetoric 
in inter-war Yugoslavia.  Broz was well trained in Communist, specifically Bolshevik, methods, 
having witnessed the revolution of 1917 in Russia first-hand. When hostilities commenced, Broz fled 
to Belgrade.  In Belgrade he met with his Politburo and decided to begin an uprising of the CPY 
against the occupiers, in part at least to relieve pressure from the new front forming in the Soviet 
Union.  On the day of the German invasion of the USSR, Josip Broz, known by the codename “Tito” 
to the majority of the CPY, called upon all Yugoslavian Communists in a proclamation.  Tito said 
that, “The hour has struck to take arms for your freedom against Fascist aggressors. Do your part in 
the fight for freedom under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The war of the 
Soviet Union is your war, because the Soviet Union is fighting the enemies, under whose yoke your 
necks are bent.”8  As the fall of 1941 began in Yugoslavia, two men of different origins and different 
motives began separate and eventually conflicting struggles to free their nation from the occupiers.  
By the close of 1941 however only one of them was receiving coverage in the Western press. 
B. 1941 – 1942 in the Eyes of the West 
                                                
8 Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 149. 
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 On May 25th, 1942, the cover 
of Time Magazine pictured Draža 
Mihailović, the “Eagle of 
Yugoslavia”, pictured against a 
backdrop of mountain crags.  
Time’s portrayal of Mihailović 
was admiring, if not reverent.  
Time wrote that, “As a legend, 
Draja Mihailovich will 
unquestionably live as long as 
World War II is remembered.”9  
Draža Mihailović and his Četniks 
during 1941 and 1942 were 
depicted as heroes by the western 
media.  Mihailović’s freedom 
fighters represented that spirit of seemingly futile resistance in the face of incalculable odds which 
many American and British observers could not see elsewhere in occupied Europe.  Time’s glowing 
appraisal of Mihailović and his Četnik guerillas was not an aberration but the norm in Western press 
coverage of Yugoslavia during the first two years of the conflict.  C. E. Black, the Eastern Europe 
correspondent for Current History magazine in the United States, wrote in his October 1942 
evaluation of the situation within occupied Yugoslavia, “In the Balkans, there was every evidence 
that the spirit of the conquered peoples was not only high, but that it was constantly growing more 
                                                
9 “The Eagle of Yugoslavia,” Time,( 25 May 1942). 
Figure 3: Mihailović pictured on Time cover May 25th, 1942 
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daring and aggressive.”10  The Serbian people, so hardened by occupation and conflict in the past, 
were now refusing to be subjugated by yet another encroaching foreign power.  
 This Western image of the indomitable people of Serbia was quite prevalent, fueled by the 
continuing reports of bravery and resistance within Yugoslavia. Ray Brock wrote in the October 12, 
1941 edition of the New York Times that, “These Chetniks…vowed to fight for their country not to 
‘the last Serbian,’ but to ‘the last German,’ or ‘the last Italian.’ They are villagers and city folk, 
farmer, shepherds, sailors, small merchants. Some of them have picked up their weapons for their 
homeland in as many as four wars.”11  In this article entitled “They are Accustomed to Die,” Ray 
Brock, who was in country when the Nazi invasion began, praised the Serbian people for their 
hardiness and their readiness to fight for their homeland.  The Serbian people had a certain reputation 
in the West for hardiness, perhaps formed in no small part by Serbia’s role in the First World War.  
Serbia, then an independent nation, refused to accept Austro-Hungarian ultimatums that would have 
infringed upon their sovereignty and fought a brave war against a far larger foe. Serbian scholar 
Aleksa Djilas called this Western idea of a common trait of “malevolent, vengeful, and obstinate 
defiance” among the Serbian people inat.12  This concept of the inat in the West was built upon the 
successes of the Serbian people against the Ottomans and in the First World War, but inat was also 
clear in the 1920’s when the Serbians were unwilling to accept a compromise Democratic 
government.  Brock praised not only the Serbian people, but also the history of the Četnik movement, 
both during conflict and in peacetime government. Brock wrote that, “While picturesque and reckless 
in action, the Četniks in peacetime are among the foremost government leaders and advisers, with a 
strong sense of politics and diplomacy.”13 
                                                
10 C. E. Black, “Revolt in the Balkans,” Current History, 3 (October 1942): 131-133. 
11 Ray Brock, “They are Accustomed To Die,” New York Times, (12 October 1941), 6(SM). 
12 Aleksa Djilas, “Funeral Oration for Yugoslavia,” Dejan Djokić, ed.,  Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed 
Idea (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 317-318. 
13 Ray Brock, “They are Accustomed To Die,” New York Times, (12 October 1941), 6(SM). 
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Amidst such positive spotlight pieces, the Četniks were receiving a near total monopoly of 
coverage and credit for all acts of sabotage and resistance within Yugoslavia. This was, perhaps, less 
than totally accurate.  Tito and his partisans had been actively resisting foreign occupation, though 
how much and to what extent in comparison to Mihailović is difficult to say.  There were no 
impartial accounts of this period in Yugoslavia, and much of the first hand accounts are a bit chaotic.  
There were, however, a few examples of attacks that the Western press attributed to Mihailović that 
were almost certainly associated with Tito and his Partisans.  For example, The New York Times 
reported on December 5th, 1941 that, “The Serbian forces of General Draja Mkahilovitch counter-
attacked a German armored column in the snowy heights above Uzice.”14 This attack was probably 
not directed towards the Četniks (though to what degree the Germans understood and consciously 
acted upon the separation among Yugoslav resistance at this point is uncertain).  Uzice was, 
according to Tito’s wartime account, the Partisan headquarters in the later parts of 1941 and printing 
location of the Partisan propaganda newspaper, Borba.15 These and other inaccuracies, particularly 
during the early stages of guerilla conflict within Yugoslavia, were probably not malicious or 
deliberate in purpose.  Most likely they can be attributed to simple ignorance and lack of solid 
information (either official or otherwise) coming from sources who were aware of actual events.  
 Why then was Mihailović receiving a monopoly of attention and coverage in the western press?  
Mihailović was fighting the Germans, but so was Tito.  The difference was not in their composition, 
position, or activity, but in what official recognition they could gather.  Mihailović was a Serbian 
member of the Royal Army of Yugoslavia, and thus when Mihailović informed the Yugoslav 
government in exile, first stationed in Cairo and then in London, that he had escaped to Ravna Gora, 
Mihailović was naturally recognized as a bastion of Yugoslav resistance in a maelstrom of violence.  
The contrast between Tito and Mihailović even at this stage was stark.  Tito was the leader of an 
                                                
14 Ray Brock, “Serbians Extend Fight to Danube,” New York Time, (6 December 1941), 1. 
15 Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 160. 
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organization seen as dangerous, subversive, and hence illegal by the official government of 
Yugoslavia during the pre-war years.  Mihailović was not only a loyalist leader of resistance forces, 
but as a former member of the military, his continuing defiance of German occupation could lend a 
degree of legitimacy to the Yugoslavian government’s claims of ongoing resistance.  Mihailović was 
King Peter’s chosen champion, and both men became intertwined as the success of one would lead to 
the success of the other.  King Peter needed the military legitimacy of Mihailović to ensure that his 
nation would be returned to him after the war and Mihailović needed the political legitimacy Peter 
could use to procure arms and supplies from the Western 
Allies.  It was with this idea in mind that Peter promoted 
then Colonel Mihailović to Brigadier General and Secretary 
of War on December 7th, 1941.16  
 The impact of this relationship on the Western role in 
Yugoslavia was more significant than it appears. Both 
Roosevelt and Churchill had committed themselves 
publically to the support of the troubled young monarch and 
his official government in London.  On April 4th, 1941, The 
Times in London reported that, “The British Government 
declared that is was their intention fully to restore the 
independence of Yugoslavia.”17 Likewise, on April 9th, The 
Times reported Roosevelt’s assurances of support to the distressed Yugoslavs. Even prior to official 
United States entry into the war, Roosevelt promised “all material aid possible in accordance with the 
existing statutes,” and expressed his “most earnest hopes for a most successful resistance to this 
                                                
16 Walter R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1973), 367-368. 
17 “British Promise to Yugoslavia,” The London Times, (4 April 1941). 
Figure 4: Mihailović as he most likely 
appeared during wartime. From Patriot 
or Traitor by David Martin. 
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criminal assault.”18  On December 18th, 1941, King Peter spoke at a luncheon for the National 
Defence Public Interest Committee in Dorchester, Britain.  Peter criticized the totalitarian rule of his 
father and uncle and pointed out key errors made by the regency that preceded him and defending the 
actions of his people during the coup d’état in March of 1941. Secretary of State for British colonial 
India Amery, present at the luncheon, said, “(we) looked to King Peter to play a great part in the 
creation of the true new order in Europe.”19  Peter and his government were becoming more than just 
a successful group of revolutionaries; they were becoming legitimate political players on the world 
stage.   
 On the ground in Yugoslavia, Mihailović received the first envoy from the British military, 
Captain L. T. Hudson, in October 1941.20  The Western allies had chosen their champion and, in 
accordance with the requests from King Peter and his government, began a limited program of arms 
and supplies distribution to Mihailović and his Četnik fighters.  Tito appeared to have been passed 
over by the Western allies, though not unexpectedly and perhaps due to ignorance. Tito himself 
bargained at least on the recognition and support of the Soviet Union.  The political predicament of 
the Soviet Union was more complex than those of Britain or the United States as the Soviets were 
fully aware of the presence of Partisan resistance in Yugoslavia but still committed to the official 
organ of the Yugoslavian government in London.  Stalin denied Tito military aid and political 
recognition. Tito and his Politburo made concerted efforts to obtain Soviet military aid, but were 
repeatedly denied because of supposed infeasibility and possible political complications.21  Stalin’s 
motivations for denying the most active Communist resistance movement in Europe aid or even 
recognition were many and varied, but Tito wrote that, “Stalin never wanted a new progressive 
movement to be created…which would rely on its own forces, and would not await liberation from 
                                                
18 “All Possible US Aid to Yugoslavia,” The London Times, (4 April 1941). 
19 “Yugoslavia After The War,” The London Times, (18 December 1941). 
20 Walter R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1973), 28-29. 
21 Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 175-178. 
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the Red Army.”22   The lack of Soviet aid left Tito essentially alone without badly needed 
ammunition, food, and medical supplies to provide for his guerilla forces.  
 By mid 1942, the Western press and Western governments were singing the praises of Draža 
Mihailović, the so-called “Eagle of Yugoslavia”, defender of a nation and retainer of the King.  Josip 
Broz Tito and his Communist Partisans were also fighting for the freedom of their homeland, but 
their coverage was limited to smatterings of reports about captured Communists being executed by 
German and Ustaše occupiers. The people in the United States and Great Britain read about 
Mihailović exclusively as he was the target of focused official Yugoslavian propaganda and officially 
supported by the Western leaders.  In late 1942, however, reports of a breakdown of cooperation 
between the Partisans and Četniks began to surface in the Western media, and a civil war began that 
encompassed not only the combatants on the ground in Yugoslavia, but that spread into both public 
and private spheres in the West.  
III. 1942-1943 in Yugoslavia 
A. Četniks and Partisans – Composition and Motivations 
Late in 1942, reports began to surface in the Western press of clashes within Yugoslavia not 
between the guerillas and the occupiers, but instead between opposing groups of Yugoslavian 
freedom fighters.  Hanson Baldwin, in November 1942, wrote in the New York Times that, “Within 
Yugoslavia, a ‘house divided against itself’ is torn by warfare against axis invaders, by guerilla 
attacks and civil strife.”23  The “civil strife” that Hanson Baldwin was referring to was no innovation 
in local Slavic affairs but more a refrain of years past.   Yugoslavia was a nation built on convenience 
rather than cohesion.  The region had been torn asunder and reassembled after the Balkan Wars in 
1912 and 1913 and again by the treaty of Versailles in 1919.  The conflicts in part broke down along 
ethnic lines, and these ethnic and ideological tensions again boiled over beginning in 1942.  The 
                                                
22 Ibid., 178. 
23 Hanson Baldwin, “Within Yugoslavia – I,” New York Times, (19 November 1942), 12. 
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surprising revelation that Draža Mihailović was not the only freedom fighter in Yugoslavia changed 
the direction of and influences on 
Western perception during 1942 and into 
1943.   
The roots of the Č etnik movement 
were quite deep in south Slavic culture.  
Četnik comes from the Serbo-Croatian 
word četa which means military 
company, and this movement was no 
innovation.  The south Slavic peoples 
endured centuries of foreign occupation, 
and, often unable to muster traditional, 
organized resistance, they opposed their occupiers by covert sabotage and guerilla warfare.  In the 
prewar years, the Č etnik organization was more of a club for Serbian military veterans, but its 
direction and purpose would change drastically during the first year of the conflict.  Draža 
Mihailović had fought for Serbia in a series of wars in the Balkans including The First and Second 
Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First World War, and he was a colonel in the royal military in 
Belgrade when the German military invaded in April 1941. Mihailović was uniquely qualified to lead 
a guerilla movement as he was one of a minority of interwar Yugoslavian officers to advocate a 
guerilla infrastructure in the military.  In the late 1930’s, Mihailović was jailed for thirty days for 
advocating subdivision of the Yugoslavian military into sub-national ethnic units in order to 
encourage greater morale and effective cohesion.24  
                                                
24 Philip B. Minehan, Civil War and World War in Europe: Spain, Yugoslavia, and Greece, 1936-1949 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2006), 107. 
Figure 5: Draža Mihalović with American Colonel McDowell 
and Četnik officers in September 1944 at Dvori.  Image taken 
from Trial of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović, 96. 
 18 
Mihailović fled Belgrade in April 1941 and reached Ravna Gora by May 13th with a small 
nucleus of his military colleagues who escaped imprisonment. This group met to decide how best to 
proceed against foreign occupation.  Their choice of direction would be fateful.  With Mihailović 
presiding, the group made a few key decisions.  First, they would declare themselves to the fleeing 
official government as a resistance movement, though what that might entail was more complex.  
Mihailović thought, and the majority agreed, that true, offensive resistance was impractical as they 
could not hope to hold territory even if they could liberate it. Their primary goals should be to recruit 
primarily from the Serbian national infrastructure of the Č etnik organization and organize for 
calculated resistance. When sufficiently organized for military action, they then might engage in 
defensive maneuvers and measured offensive sabotage and disruption.25  Fear of reprisals and a 
conservative eye toward an eventual allied liberation of Yugoslavia both contributed to the formation 
of this particular policy. 
To the British, by late 1942 Mihailović seemed irrationally conservative.  Colonel Bailey of the 
British military overheard (not accidentally to be sure) a speech delivered by Draža Mihailović to his 
troops on February 28th, 1943. Mihailovic enumerated five facts about the state of resistance in 
Yugoslavia.  First, the Serbs were “completely friendless; that the British, to suit their own strategic 
purposes, were pressing them to engage in operations without any intent of helping them.”26 Second, 
King Peter his government were being held hostage by the British government, slaves to the whims 
of Churchill.  Third, the activities of the partisans were “hypocritical and anti-Yugoslav … (and) a 
satisfaction for the Allies’ lust for fraud.” Fourth, he would continue to accommodate Italian forces 
so long as they remained his “only adequate source of help generally.”  Fifth, and most troubling for 
the British, Mihailovic would only turn to fighting Germans and Italians once “the Ustashi, the 
Partisans, the Croats, and the Moslems,” had been dealt with.  
                                                
25 Ibid., 109. 
26 Quotes taken from Colonel Bailey’s report to Churchill, found in Walter R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic, 
and the Allies, 1941-1945 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 93. 
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This report was earth shattering for the British and their confidence in Mihailović as a champion 
of anti-axis resistance in Yugoslavia, but it was also demonstrative of Mihailović’s stance on the 
conflict.  To Mihailović, the war was primarily internal, not external.  The Partisans, Ustaše, Croats, 
and Moslems (Bosnian Serbs) were the real enemies.  Interesting here was his greatest omission of 
the quisling Serbs under Milan Nedić.  Nedić’s Vichy France-like government, sponsored by the 
axis, seemed to be a logical target, even if Mihailović limited himself to domestic foes.  Mihailović 
was a Serb, and his Četnik forces were nearly homogeneous in contrast to the ethnic pluralism of the 
Partisans.  Mihailović left out the Serb traitor and targeted all those of other ethnic backgrounds. To 
Churchill, this was troubling.  He wrote a remark to Yugoslav Prime Minister Jovanović in which he 
said that “His majesties government…could never justify to the British people nor to their own Allies 
their continued support of a movement, the leader of which does not scruple to declare…that his 
enemies are not Germans and Italians, invaders of his country, but his fellow Yugoslavs and chief 
among them men who at this very moment are fighting and giving their lives to free his country from 
the foreigner’s yoke.”27 The divide between Churchill and Mihailović was growing, and the Partisan 
movement was becoming not only more active, but more appealing and deserving of Allied aid and 
support.  
The Partisan movement developed under similar circumstances.  The driving force behind its 
founding was the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), but by the time in-
fighting was developing between the Partisans and Četniks, the membership encompassed more than 
simply Communists.  Tito and his Politburo brilliantly shaped the perception and proclaimed purpose 
of their movement to make it both viable and inclusive.  The CPY in the interwar years was a 
minority organization, and while the members of the CPY constituted the first waves of volunteers 
                                                
27 Walter R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1973), 94. 
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for the Partisans’ resistance, unassociated 
general peasantry throughout the nation 
joined in droves as the conflict matured.   
There are several reasons why the 
CPY was effective in crafting a national 
resistance movement.  First, the CPY, as 
with most Communists, was exceedingly 
creative in its nomenclature.  The official 
name of the resistance movement was the National Liberation Front led by the Anti-Fascist Council 
of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ).  Milovan Djilas, a member of Tito’s Politburo from 
Montenegro, wrote in the volume of his autobiography entitled Wartime that, “It was tactically more 
opportune – all the more so since the Comintern and Soviet Leadership so believed – not to flaunt 
revolutionary phrases.  The term “National Liberation Struggle” was more attractive and accurate.”28  
Djilas, along with Edvard Kardelj, the resident Marxist philosopher, and Alexsander Ranković, the 
chief of Tito’s secret police, constituted the primary members of Tito’s inner circle. A “National 
Liberation Struggle” was far more inclusive than a Communist uprising, but even more than 
eliminating political divisions, Tito strove to unite ethnic groups as well.  The four primary members 
of Tito’s Politburo were of different ethnic groups.  Tito was a Croat, Ranković a Serb, Kardelj was a 
Slovene, and Djilas was from Montenegro. The Četnik movement was by Serbs, for Serbia and the 
Serbian people.  The Partisan National Liberation Front was for Yugoslavia, by the Yugoslavs and 
thus infinitely more appealing to the masses.  Tito himself, in a directive issued on August 10th, 1941 
“proclaimed the main purpose of the Partisan detachments was the liberation of the peoples of 
Yugoslavia from the occupation forces…Partisan detachments were called National Liberation 
Detachments because they were the fighting formations not of any political party or group (and) 
                                                
28  Milovan Djilas, Wartime (New York: Harcourt Brave Jovanovich, 1977),  95. 
 
Figure 6: Partisan leadership at Vis in 1944.  Tito is on the far right 
and Kardelj in the middle with the moustache and glasses. 
Imperial  War Museum Collection:  NA 
15129 
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should include all patriots, whatever their views.”29 Tito was building a movement not only for the 
short-term goals of liberation, but a movement that would unite the nation and lend legitimacy to this 
struggle against the occupiers and his Četnik rivals. Tito, though he would never espouse it publicly 
or in the available party literature, no doubt saw AVNOJ as a building block of a Communist post-
war Yugoslavia, a Yugoslavia with Tito and the CPY as the rulers.  Tito would consider AVNOJ and 
the congresses they held in November of 1942 and 1943 precursors to post-war government, but he 
would never claim that this council and subsequent government would be necessarily Communist in 
nature.30 
Djilas began his revolutionary experience as chief of the Partisans in Montenegro where he led 
the first successful liberation of an entire part of Yugoslavia.  Djilas was reprimanded, as Tito put it, 
because “it was incorrect to separate the Partisan struggle from the people’s uprising.”31 Revolution 
was a necessary step, according to Karl Marx, in the journey from a capitalist nation to a proletarian-
ruled Communist regime, a paradigm confirmed and reinforced by the revolutionary step of 
Bolshevik Russia.  “Revolution” was going to be difficult to reproduce as it occurred in Russia in 
1917 in the case of Yugoslavia.  Djilas had led a revolution in Montenegro in early 1942, and Tito, 
most likely advised by Kardelj, understood that the circumstances in Yugoslavia were not conducive 
to Bolshevik-style strong armed power.  Djilas wrote that,  
“Kardelj, too, believed that a revolution had already begun in Yugoslavia…To 
be sure it was not a ‘pure’ proletarian revolution: the uprising against the 
occupation made the revolution a national one, while the bankruptcy of the old 
regime, and its collaboration with the enemy, propelled the Communist Party to 
the fore as the leader. Yet if we employed the term ‘Revolution,’ the 
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reactionaries and profascists would depict the armed struggle against the 
occupation as the Communists’ struggle for their own and Soviet power.”32 
This was the danger that both Tito and Stalin foresaw.  Tito’s struggle must remain nationalistic in 
nature and there could be no indication that it was his intention to establish a Communist post-war 
Yugoslavia.  In a land now free of political parties save one, that last party must earn its place as the 
rightful heir of the nation that it was shedding its blood to liberate.  Regardless of the cost in blood, 
regardless of the fear of possible reprisals for their resistance, Tito and his followers would throw 
their entire might against the occupiers and other rival national groups for the duration of the war. 
B. Tito vs. Mihailović: A Conflict of Opinion in the West 
The deficit of reliable information at the 
disposal of American and British 
newspaper editors was slowly beginning 
to change.  An obvious amount of public 
interest in the guerilla warfare going on in 
Yugoslavia had encouraged media outlets 
to send correspondents into closer contact 
with action on the ground.  The public 
was enamored of stories of defiance 
against all odds flooding out of Yugoslavia.  Time magazine 
selected Draža Mihailović along with Douglas MacArthur, Chang 
Kai-shek of nationalist China, and Stepan Timoshenko of the Soviet Union as the most popular 
Allied generals.33  The pro-Mihailović monopoly in the Western media was about to end as news of 
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Figure 7: Cartoon from Current 
History magazine, October 1942 
edition. 
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Tito and even accusation of Č etnik-Axis collaboration began to surface in the waning months of 
1942. 
 The Daily Worker was the first organ of the Western press to not only recognize, but endorse Tito 
and his Partisans over Mihailović and the Četniks.  A brief three to five page bulletin published out 
of New York City, The Daily Worker was the official newspaper of the American Communist Party, 
still legal as of the early 1940’s.  The American Communist Party or Communist Party USA was a 
member of the soon to be dissolved Communist international or Comintern which, guided by the 
Soviet Union, had worked to unite and promote the development of Communism.  The paper was 
thus riddled with propaganda.  The news, sports, and cultural coverage in The Daily Worker during 
the 1940s had three major themes.  First, it nearly exclusively covered the development of the Soviet 
front during the war and the exploits of the Soviet government.  The Soviet Union was at this time 
the only autonomous Communist government and served not only as a model for aspiring 
Communist parties, but international Communist leaders also looked toward Stalin and the Soviets as 
a source of guidance and direction.  Second, The Daily Worker cataloged labor disputes and reported 
pro-organized labor stories.  As the root of Communism is the proletariat class and the rights of the 
laborer, this is not surprising.  Third, and perhaps most interesting considering the time period, The 
Daily Worker was an outspoken champion of racial equality, particularly racial integration of 
professional sports in the United States. While certainly not mainstream, The Daily Worker was a 
legitimate newspaper that covered legitimate stories, albeit with a spin toward their particular 
political affiliations and motivations. 
  Since the reports of resistance began to surface in 1941, The Daily Worker had toed the line 
along with the rest of the Western media, accepting Mihailović and publishing reports of his exploits.  
Quite abruptly, in July 1942, The Daily Worker performed an about face.  In the July 27th issue, The 
Daily Worker published a report claiming that Radio Free Yugoslavia had accused Mihailović and 
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his Chetniks of collaboration with both quisling Yugoslavs and foreign occupiers.34  The Daily 
Worker argued that Tito and his partisans did not “represent some sort of ‘Communist guerilla gangs’ 
but patriots who hold the interests of their people and the destiny of their country above all else.”35   
A measure of explanation is required.  Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, Konstantin Fotić, 
claimed that no such entity called “Radio Free Yugoslavia” existed, but he was incorrect.  In fact, 
Radio Free Yugoslavia was broadcasting from the Ural Mountains, managed from an office in 
Moscow, and was used to spew constant pro-Communist, pro-Tito propaganda into Yugoslavia 
during the conflict.36  The Soviets were playing both sides at once. Officially, the Soviets remained 
pro-Mihailović, but covertly they were working to place Tito in a more advantageous position.  The 
Yugoslavian government realized this. In a message from Prime Minister Slobodan Jovanović to 
Mihailović, Jovanović explained that the Yugoslavian government was insisting to the Soviets, “first 
on immediate cessation of radio and press campaign against Yugoslav Army under your 
command.”37  As Radio Free Yugoslavia was broadcasting from Moscow into Yugoslavia alone, it 
was therefore at least quite probable that the information published in The Daily Worker originated 
from Comintern sources.   
The Daily Worker continued to publish scathing reports about the Četniks over the coming years. 
On February 28th, 1943, in another summary of Radio Free Yugoslavia reports, the paper classed 
Mihailović with the likes of the German and Italian occupiers and the quisling Ustaše of Croatia 
reporting “severe battles between the Liberation army…against the Ustasi and Chetniks of the traitor, 
Draza Mikhailovitch, and that the enemy was suffering heavy losses”38  Even more intriguing, 
published on March 11th, 1943, was yet another summary of a Radio Free Yugoslavia interview with 
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Dr. Metod Mikush, a Catholic priest of Ljubljana.  Dr. Mikush called Mihailović and his Četniks the 
Judas Iscariot of the nation of Yugoslavia. Mikush said, “The Catholics of Slovenia, fighting 
shoulder to shoulder with the Communists, have seen the diabolical lies spread by the enemies of the 
Communist Party…May the ideas of Christ, the King, the idea of a great, unifying love and brotherly 
collaboration really become enthroned in our hearts.”39  Stories like these criticizing and slandering 
Draža Mihailović and his Č etniks appeared regularly throughout the rest of the war in The Daily 
Worker, despite marked objections by the Yugoslavian embassy in Washington.  The average 
American did not read this publication, nor if he read it would he in every case believe the reports it 
printed. The Daily Worker was therefore by no means a mainstream publication, but its 
condemnations of the previously lionized Mihailović began to signify the end of his invulnerability 
in the Western press.  
The real turn in press coverage occurred on December 19th, 1942.  A Slovenian-American named 
Louis Adamic published a relatively balanced and well informed analysis of not 
only the current situation on the ground in Yugoslavia, but about how the 
conflict had been portrayed in the West.  His piece, published in The Saturday 
Evening Post, was entitled “Mikhailovitch: Balkan Mystery Man.”  Adamic was 
a professional writer, author of a book called The Native’s Return in which he 
documented his return trip to his homeland of Croatia during the inter-war 
period.  Adamic, as a native of Yugoslavia, had the excellent resource of 
relatives and friends on the ground in Yugoslavia who could keep him informed 
of the happenings and the situation in country during the war.  With these 
resources, Adamic produced this well-informed, surprisingly accurate appraisal 
of activity in Yugoslavia. 
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Figure 8: Mihailović before the 
war began. From Mikhailovitch 
and Yugoslav Resistance by 
Alec Brown. 
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The majority of the first half of his article was devoted to providing the average American reader 
who is not versed in Balkan affairs with a brief summary of the situation in Yugoslavia to date. 
Adamic admitted that between summer 1941 and the present, December 1942, the press had made 
Mihailović a, “legendary figure – a bold Balkan superman defying the monstrous Axis from his 
craggy mountains.”40  He also recognized the presence of a second significant resistance group 
within Yugoslavia, the Partisans.  His appraisal of the Partisan movement was measured.  He argued 
that the violence between Četnik and Partisan forces erupted because “The Partisan leaders feared 
that he (Mihailović) was the likeliest means whereby the government-in-exile…would return to 
power after the war. And the Partisans were out for a new deal in Jugoslavia.”41  As previously noted, 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was an illegal organization considered dangerous and subversive 
before the war, and Adamic astutely points out this key motivation for Partisan leadership.  
To Louis Adamic, the Partisan movement had some concrete roots and there were reasons for its 
continued growth.  Adamic argued that, following the failure of talks between Partisan and Četnik 
forces in the summer of 1941, the Partisans initiated the violence and Mihailović was forced to 
respond.  The Partisan movement, because of broad support from the peasant class and support from 
the Soviet Union, had grown to be at least numerically on par with Mihailović and his Četniks.  
Adamic placed much of the blame for the resulting discord on the Soviet Union and Soviet 
leadership.  He says that, “The fact now is that the Soviet Union has made its own the cause of the 
Jugoslav Partisan forces…The military skill of their commanders has improved with experience and 
under the tutelage of Soviet commissars and Red army officers who have been in Jugoslavia at least 
since last June.”42  This accusation is difficult to prove or disprove, though neither Tito nor Djilas in 
their memoirs mentioned Soviet involvement as anything more than cursory until very late in the 
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war.  As to the Soviet 
motivations, Adamic also had an 
idea.  He seemed doubtful that 
the motivations of the Soviet 
Union concerned only the 
military utility of tying down 
thirty-odd Axis divisions in 
Yugoslavia.  More likely, it 
seemed to Adamic, the Third International (Comintern) and the Soviet Union were aiming to produce 
a “revolutionary situation.”43  
In his article, Adamic identified three types of government in 1942 as Democratic, Fascist, and 
Revolutionary Communist.  Perhaps thinking beyond his time, Adamic saw Yugoslavia as a 
paradigm for what might come as Fascism was crushed between the two colliding theories of 
Democracy and Revolutionary Communism.   Adamic believed the Red Army’s favor toward the 
Partisans could signify a greater effort throughout Europe to incite a general revolution in place of a 
second front that the Americans and British had yet to provide.  Adamic asked the question, 
“Suppose Hitler could not beat down such a revolution in Europe – what then? Whether the one or 
the other occurs, what will have become of the third contemporary way of life – democracy?”44   
Adamic and America at large were beginning to think by 1942 that Communism’s only usefulness 
might be as an ally against the Axis.  What would Stalin and his Comintern organization do with 
liberated lands after the war? It was at least obvious at this point in time that, despite reports from 
groups like The Daily Worker of collaboration and inactivity, Mihailović would remain the chosen 
hero and the Communist Partisans the target of skepticism. 
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Figure 9: A cartoon by Dr. Seuss from 8-29-1942. 
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During late 1942 into the fall of 1943, the media in both the United States and Great Britain 
remained generally pro-Mihailović with a few exceptions, toeing the line drawn by their respective 
governments. Mihailović remained the known factor, the solid emblem of resistance, while the 
Partisan movement remained largely faceless, associated only with the Soviets.  In the American 
political magazine The Nation, John Gerber and Alfred Kantorowicz provided an overview of 
guerilla activity in Europe.  Of Yugoslavia, they wrote that, “of the two major Yugoslav guerilla 
groups, that headed by General Mihailovich has Anglo-American support and the so-called ‘partisan’ 
group has Soviet support.  The Yugoslav government-in-exile recognizes both, but recognizes the 
‘partisans’ only to oppose them.”45  With two conflicting groups both fighting the Axis and 
apparently each other as well, the Western leaders faced a decision.  Which group would they 
support, and how would they measure its merits?  As of early summer 1943, neither Britain nor the 
United States had officially recognized the activity of the Yugoslavian partisans and both continued 
open support of Draža Mihailović.46  
 The majority of the Western press followed in kind.  Carol Thompson, the Balkan 
correspondent for the foreign affairs periodical Current History, who had been reporting on the 
conflict in Eastern Europe for the war’s duration, remained a staunch supporter of Mihailović.  
Thompson reported that the Partisans made two primary accusations of Mihailović. These were, 
“their belief that he (Mihailović) has made deals with the Italians, and their feeling that he has been 
content to dawdle along avoiding open conflict.”47  She dismissed these claims and reported 
Mihailović’s subsequent denials, but most critical were her views on Mihailović as a unifying force. 
To Thompson, Mihailović was the best hope for a stable and unified post-war Yugoslavia.  “If 
Mikhailovich can make an arrangement with the Croatian groups (Partisans), he may be helping to 
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solve a big problem for the future.”48 The “big problem” she referred to was the rebuilding of a 
shattered nation, a nation that failed in its first experiment with democracy.  A unified and balanced 
distribution of power among the ethnic groups would be key in a democratic post-war Yugoslavia, 
and Thompson believed that if the Partisans would submit themselves to the authority of now 
Secretary of War Mihailović, a unified resistance movement might produce a unified government 
after the war. 
The entirety of the media was not so pro-Mihailović. Time magazine, which hailed Mihailović as 
“Eagle of Yugoslavia” in May, 1942, published a scathing article on December 14th, 1942, just five 
days prior to Louis Adamic’s article in the Saturday Evening Post.  It was entitled “Mihailovich 
Eclipsed”  Time quoted a German war correspondent who said, “they emerged like cats from 
everywhere, knives between their teeth…Men women and children flung themselves into the 
attack.”49  The war correspondent was referring not to the Četniks, but to the Partisans whom Time 
praises, claiming that the American public had been “misled” into believing Mihailović was leading 
the greatest resistance.  Tito himself was not mentioned, but his primary statesman Dr. Ivan Ribar 
was, and Time refers to the November, 1942 formation of AVNOJ in Bihać, even hailing it as the 
“provisional government.”  The BBC was another major media outlet to move early to the side of the 
Partisans.  The Yugoslav section of the BBC moved decidedly toward the Partisans in early 1943, 
reporting their activities first and placing less emphasis on the Chetniks.  This prompted Mihailović 
to respond publically saying, “The propaganda over the London radio is provoking greater and 
greater revulsion among the people…the speakers on the London radio are almost exclusively 
Croats, while the remainder, if any of them are Serbs, then they are Communists.”50  The BBC’s 
section of Yugoslavian reporters continued to voice their subtle support for the Partisan movement in 
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the coming years. Opinions like these were still rare in the Western Press, though as 1943 drew to a 
close doubt was growing in the minds of the Western leadership as to who truly deserved their 
support. 
C. Mihailović: A Hero in Popular Culture 
The heroism and defiance against all odds of the Yugoslavian resistance groups being covered by 
the Western press proved to be fuel for a different kind of publicity.  The epic saga of Draža 
Mihailović and his Četniks inspired movies, books, and even individual public action to encourage 
increased aid to these foreign freedom fighters.  Coverage and publicity in popular culture had a 
profound effect on shaping how the American and British people perceived the conflict in 
Yugoslavia as the images of Mihailović and his Četniks provided helped the common person 
personalize and sympathize with the 
Yugoslavian guerillas.  
On January 11th, 1943, Twentieth Century 
Fox released Chetniks: The Fighting Guerillas 
to general audiences across the United States.51  
The film indeed focused on Draža Mihailović 
as its protagonist and followed his efforts to 
save the Croatia town of Kotor along the 
Dalmatian coast. Mihailović, who was played 
by Dutch-born actor Phillip Dorn, dealt with a 
further complicated situation when his wife and two children are captured by a Gestapo officer in 
order to blackmail him.  The film is brief and filled with simple, heroic scenes, and in the end, 
predictably, Mihailović manages to save both his family and the city of Kotor.   
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The key part of the movie was not necessarily the stock Hollywood plot but the way that the 
writers and directors chose to portray Draža Mihailović, his soldiers, and his family.  He is quite 
obviously a man of honor, who weighs his decisions carefully.  In the opening scene, he and his 
Četniks ambush a convoy of Italian trucks and he elects to ransom away the Italians for petrol instead 
of executing them.  While at home with his family, his son mentions that he hates the Germans who 
are occupying their town and would like to shoot them.  Mihailović says to his son, “It is right to hate 
Germans, just don’t shoot so wildly that you hit your friends.”  He is cool and calculating.  He is not 
rash or quick to judgment, and he is possessed of no great bloodlust. He is a family man, portrayed 
much like an American father would have been in contemporary films.  The family prays before they 
eat, love each other, and Mihailović values and respects his wife and children.  
His greatest words are reserved 
for his countrymen who continue to 
resist occupation.  He says, “we (the 
Yugoslav people) have the will to be 
free, our people don’t like to be 
conquered, so we won’t be,” in the 
presence of the German commander 
at Kotor.  His greatest bit of dialogue 
about the strength of the Yugoslav 
people comes at the very end of the 
film, when he has liberated the city of Kotor and stands before the people to deliver his victory 
address.  He says, “As long as there is a Yugoslav able to carry arms, this holy war will continue. 
Neither German might nor German frightfulness will deter us from the goal we have set. Complete 
freedom for our people.”  The entire movie gives testimony to the struggle of the Četniks against all 
odds and the great strength and resolve of the people of Yugoslavia.   
Figure 11: From 
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/savich/098.shtml 
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The film was certainly a shining endorsement of the Četniks and their efforts to liberate 
Yugoslavia, but it was completely bereft of any reference to the Partisans.  Not evident on the 
surface, there were a few other forces covertly at work in Chetniks.  The film was planned in 
conjunction with the Yugoslavian embassy in the United States which, as an arm of the official 
government in London, was pro-Mihailović.  At the premier party in New York City, the Yugoslav 
ambassador to the United States, Konstantin Fotić, the films “military advisor” Milivoje Mishović, 
and its “technical advisor” Serge Kirzman were all invited to participate in the festivities.52  All three 
of these men were staff members at the Yugoslavian embassy in Washington.  Fotić  was the 
ambassador, Major Mishović the Assistant Military Attaché of the embassy, and Krisman a member 
of the embassy staff.53 These men and the government they served needed Mihailović, whose 
reputation had suffered because of the Partisan accusations of idleness and collaboration, to be 
portrayed in the most positive light possible.  It was evident that these two blemishes on Mihailović’s 
public image were directly addressed in the film.  One of Mihailović’s attendant officers in the film 
asks him if the men passing by are German or Italian in the opening scene, to which Mihailović 
responds, “They are the enemy, that is enough for me.”  This was in response to the growing notion 
that Mihailović was unwilling to fight certain enemies, picking his battles, and even accommodating 
certain general Allied foes.  Second, Mihailović is portrayed not as an idle protector, rarely stirring 
from his refuge, but as a fighter of determination and ceaseless vigilance, though measured and 
calculating.  A major accusation was that Mihailović was reluctant to attack Germans for fear of 
reprisals against civilians.  In the film, Mihailović continues his operations despite the Gestapo 
Colonel Brockner’s threats to kill one hundred civilians for every dead German. 
The film is certainly quite inaccurate, but accuracy was not the point of propaganda films.  It 
lionized Mihailović in a way that news dispatches or even spotlight pieces could not.  The film 
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brought Mihailović and his Četnik soldiers into a perspective that could be more easily understood by 
the average American.  He was just like us, or so the film would like the viewer to believe.  He and 
his men shared our values, our goals, and our commitment to victory. They therefore deserved our 
support and prayers in their fight against incredible odds.  The film brought a foreign, faceless 
conflict into clearer understanding regardless of the motivations or methods behind it. 
Alec Brown, the Yugoslavian correspondent for The Times in London, attempted to accomplish a 
similar goal in his short book published in 1943 in Britain entitled Mihailovitch and Yugoslav 
Resistance.  Brown was a graduate of Cambridge, earning a special diploma in Serbian and Slavonic 
studies. Brown taught at Belgrade University between the wars before becoming the wartime 
correspondent for The Times and Advisor to the Yugoslav Directory of Information.54  Part 
biography, part exposition on Yugoslavia as a country and as a people, Alec Brown’s book not only 
argued in favor of Mihailović against Tito and his Partisans, but also attempted to make the Četniks 
and their nation a more understandable quantity.  Brown’s primary tactic was to draw comparisons 
between Britain and Yugoslavia to show how similar the plights of the two nations were and what 
common roots they might have. 
First, Brown drew similarities simply on a military basis.  Both nations had experienced a feeling 
of complete isolation, with the citizens being punished by military attacks and the armed forces 
scrambling to defend their homes and families.  Brown likened the plight of his nation during the 
Battle of Britain with what the people of Yugoslavia and their leader, Draža Mihailović, were 
currently enduring.  He wrote, “Do not say: ‘We have known nothing like it in the past.’ There 
certainly have been great gaps in our national life when such fighting has not been necessary…But in 
some of our greatest moments an identical spirit has shown itself.”55  Similar is Brown’s parallel 
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between the against all odds mentality of Great Britain and Yugoslavia, both of which were totally 
surrounded by enemies at any given point during the war. 
Brown also found similarities between the attitudes of the peoples of Britain and Yugoslavia.  He 
wrote, “The real Britain takes years to know…Yugoslavia is exactly the same. How like ourselves 
they are, in their different ways! It is not a time honored piece of flattery to say that we are 
hospitable…Just the same in Serbia.”56  The people of both nations, according to Brown, possessed a 
certain attitude of hospitality, though reserved, often lurking below the surface.  Both nations had an 
indomitable spirit.  Both nations in their entirety stood against the German War Machine. Only “post-
Dunkirk Britain” and Yugoslavia were able to unite in Europe in 1941 into 1942 and stand against a 
seemingly unstoppable force.  Brown wrote that, “This alone explains the living, unconquerable 
resistance of Yugoslavia from within the enemy ranks.  Here Mihailovitch the individual and 
Mihailovitch the Yugoslav will stand forever as an inspiration and a guide.”57  
Brown certainly praised Mihailović as a symbol for unity and resistance within Yugoslavia and 
declared him specially qualified to lead a guerilla movement because of his military experience.  He 
wrote, “Drazha Mihailovitch, we may say it confidently, is a genius. He is a genius, not merely in his 
uncanny ability to carry on successful warfare in occupied country, taking prisoners and capturing 
towns, but in his restraint.”58  Brown attempted to portray Mihailović and Yugoslavia as a single, 
cohesive unit.  If one fell, so would the other.  The characteristics of one dictated the characteristics 
of the other. Alec Brown’s book worked in a similar way as the American film though in perhaps a 
more logical, intelligent way; it attempted to bring Mihailović and the plight of Yugoslavia down to a 
plane and a context that the common American or Englishman could understand.  Both works 
obviously lionized the Četnik leader, but they also worked to build support for him by encouraging 
empathy among the general population of the Western Allies. 
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Fredrick Heydenau’s novel Wrath of the Eagles continued in this vein of creating sympathetic 
feelings and understanding for the Četnik fighters.  The novel centered on the activities of General 
Mihailović and a number of Č etniks who fought under him, but also critical to the plot was an 
American liaison officer who arrived by submarine in the novel’s opening scene.  Ensign Stevens 
was selected to bring weapons and gas masks to the Č etnik fighters from the United States Navy 
because his Serbian-born father taught him a measure of his native language.  The characters and plot 
of this book would fit in quite well in a western film or in a modern day action movie as they fight 
and defeat an evil enemy against almost unimaginable odds and do so with little to no casualties.  
The book can be a bit unbelievable at times and is obviously a work of fiction.  New York Time book 
reviewer Robert St. John called the Chetnik forces portrayed in Wrath of the Eagles, “Supermen, 
comic strip characters, capable of the fantastic.”59  They tackled a German armored division and 
liberated a city with nothing more than cobbled together rifles, small arms, and some well placed 
dynamite.  The portrayal of the Četnik fighters was no doubt a bit fantastic, but Heydenau’s purpose 
seemed to be similar to that of Alec Brown and the makers of the Chetniks film; Heydenau was 
lauding the successes and spirit of these guerillas. 
Heydenau, an Austrian by birth who fought on the Serbian front during World War I,60 made an 
interesting selection in choosing the primary foe for the Četniks.  It was not the Germans or Italians 
as in the film, but the Croatian Ustaše.  The book contained example after example of Ustaše 
brutalities and atrocities.  At one point, after breaking into and trashing the china shop of an old man, 
Ustaše officers forced him to kneel over and over in broken glass for displaying pictures of former 
Serbian rulers.61  Mihailović stated in the novel that, “The Ustashi are a group of Croats in no way to 
be confused with the great mass of Croats.  The Croats have always been opportunists.  They 
managed to get along with the Austrians when the Austrians were in power. And they most likely 
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could find a way of cooperating with Germany herself rather than wage war against her, if they were 
offered political liberty.”62  Accusations like these of Croatian collaboration, while founded in the 
reality of Ustaše atrocities, were largely stereotypical and helped form anti-Croatian perceptions in 
the United States and elsewhere.  These stereotypes would be applied to the largely Croatian Partisan 
forces and help to prevent an equal level of 
Western acceptance.  
Certain citizens in the United States 
and Britain turned their efforts to public 
advocacy to better promote their particular 
point of view.  One example of these 
citizen advocates was Ruth Mitchell, sister 
of then recently deceased American 
General Billy Mitchell.  Ruth Mitchell was 
a writer, married to an Englishman, and 
was traveling in Albania, writing a 
guidebook, when the Italian invasion and 
subsequent conflict with Greece began in 1938.63  Mitchell was expelled from Albania by the Italian 
occupiers as a suspected spy and arrived in Belgrade, where she met Comitaji leaders, a group that 
would eventually serve Draža Mihailović.  Mitchell joined the resistance organization and 
purportedly fought the Germans when they invaded Yugoslavia in 1941.  She was not heard from 
again until she was located in the Leibenau concentration camp in Wuerttemberg on December 24th, 
1941.  The US State Department was able to secure her release and return home by summer of 1942.   
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In the remaining years of the war, Ruth Mitchell used her experiences in Europe as a platform for 
her two primary advocacy efforts.  First, Mitchell attempted to increase the awareness of the 
atrocities of the German concentration camp system in Europe, which she had experienced first 
hand.64 Mitchell was also a strong supporter of increased US and British aid and recognition for 
Mihailović and the Četniks.  She fought and lived with the Četniks for several months while on the 
ground in Yugoslavia and considered them “the heart of Serbia, and Serbia is the heart of 
Yugoslavia, which has dared to talk back to Hitler.”65  Mitchell met with the President, toured the 
country speaking to primarily women’s groups, and even wrote a book describing her experiences 
and support for the Chetnik fighters of Yugoslavia.  Her autobiographical book entitled The Serbs 
Choose War covers her time during the late 1930’s and the early 1940’s spent in the Balkans.  The 
book was a narrative, but it was also a passionate argument in favor of the Četniks.  Mitchell was 
pro-Serbian, not pro-Yugoslavian.  She had little positive to say about the Croatians or other ethnic 
groups and reserves all her praise for the Serbs and their chosen champion, Mihailović.  Mitchell 
writes that, “The Serbs chose war. In spite of all the horrors they expected, this small race almost 
unanimously decide to oppose themselves against the greatest war machine of history.  And in spite 
of the unexpected, unpredictable horrors that have befallen them, they still choose war.”66   
The book was similar in many ways to Black Lamb and Grey Falcon written by American 
Rebecca West in 1937 to describe not only the journey of the author through Yugoslavia, but the 
author’s feelings about the land and the people around her.  West’s book was quite long and focused 
primarily on her love of the Serbian people as both the Croats and Slovenes take a secondary role at 
best.67  Mitchell too admired the Serbs and held no great love for the Croats whom she easily 
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associated with the Ustaše regime.  Mitchell admired the Serbs as a people for their brave struggle 
and for the virtues of their society. To Mitchell, the Serbs deserved Allied aid perhaps more than any 
other freedom fighters in Europe.  Mitchell implored the American people, both in her speaking 
circuit and in her book, to help her fulfill her own pledge to the Serbian people. Mitchell describes 
this pledge in her conclusion writing that, “I gave the dying men and women of Serbia my promise 
that I would spend the rest of my life looking after their children.  I promised them that America 
would never forget the bond and the debt…I pledged the honor of my country.  I rely upon my 
countrymen with complete trust to help me to keep that pledge.”68  Mitchell’s factual accounts of the 
heroism and bravery of the Serbian freedom fighters had a great impact on the American people and 
their perception of the conflict in Yugoslavia. 
By fall of 1943, the tide of the war had turned.  The Italians capitulated on September 8th and the 
Red Army was slowly pushing back the German advance. With the Italian surrender, the German 
military obligations in Yugoslavia became more pronounced and opportunities for more open 
resistance presented themselves.  The time was ripe for a more aggressive form of opposition in 
Yugoslavia, and the Allies were becoming suspicious of Mihailović’s continued conservative policy.  
Regardless of private doubts by the leaders of the Allied forces, the public was still firmly in favor of 
the Četniks.  This would change in the ensuing year, though gradually at best.  On May 28th, 1943, 
British Colonel F.W. Deakin and a small contingent of liaison officers parachuted into the highlands 
of Montenegro as the first official diplomatic mission to Tito and the Partisans.  Deakin would be 
followed by other British and later American liaison officers, but the establishment of official contact 
with a group that Churchill would barely officially recognize showed that at least Western leaders 
were beginning to act upon their growing doubts.  As the outcome of the war began to crystallize, the 
question of Yugoslavia after the war became all the more prevalent.  
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IV. A Warp in the West    
A. Churchill’s Decision 
 The abandonment of Draža 
Mihailović came neither suddenly nor 
without careful consideration by the 
leaders Britain and the United States.  As 
evidenced, Mihalović remained a bulwark 
in popular culture.  Doubt was, however, 
brewing in the minds of the Western 
leaders, and the press at large was 
beginning to accept Tito as, if not a viable 
alternative, at least a competitor worthy of 
acknowledgment.  While the purpose of 
this paper is not to present an analysis of 
precisely how and why the Allies eventually chose Tito over Mihailović, an adequate understanding 
of some of the main reasons is instructive.  The decision came first from Churchill and the British, 
followed somewhat reluctantly later by Roosevelt and the Americans.  Churchill spoke to parliament 
in February 1944 declaring his intention to shift support to Marshal Tito and ordered his liaison 
officers in May to leave Mihailović.69  Churchill’s reasons centered mainly on the doubts that had 
been growing concerning the utility of Mihailović as an ally over the previous two years coupled 
with the reports of the liaison officers he had dispatched to Tito’s camp.  Regardless of the reasons, 
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by summer, 1944, Mihailović had been utterly abandoned and with his defeat by Partisan forces at 
Drina on May 10th, 1945, he was forced into hiding.70  
 As previously discussed, Churchill was aware of a certain inflexibility in Mihailović’s wartime 
priorities.  Colonel Bailey’s report in February of 1943 had demonstrated that the Četnik priorities 
might not line up directly with overarching allied goals.71  Churchill and Roosevelt agreed with a 
resolution in concord with the allied forces in June of 1941 that all those fighting the axis would have 
three goals:  They would fight against German or Italian oppression until total victory with mutual 
assistance among all allied parties, accept no settled peace or prosperity while the Axis continued to 
oppress free peoples, and the only true basis of enduring peace would be cooperation among free 
people both in war and in peace.72  Mihailović had different priorities.  His policy was to husband his 
forces for an eventual allied liberation or German collapse and to direct his primary wrath toward 
internal subversive groups, particularly the Ustaše and Partisans.   
 In April of 1943, Churchill still had hope that Mihailović could be a useful ally. He wrote in a 
letter to Roosevelt that, “I believe that, in spite of his present foxy attitude, Mihailović will throw his 
whole weight against the Italians the moment we are able to give him any effective help.  Evidently 
great possibilities are open in this theatre.”73 Bailey and Hudson had been in place now for two years 
as liaison officers to the Četniks and Mihailović, but the two Western leaders began internal 
discussions in October of 1943 to send a more focused mission to the Yugoslavian guerillas.  
Roosevelt proposed an American officer, Brigadier General William Donovan, head of the fledgling 
Office of Strategic Services or OSS, to command a bi-national liaison party to General Mihailović.  
Roosevelt proposed that, “all agencies working in the Balkans should be put under his direction and 
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the resources we put into this effort should be at his disposal.”74  Churchill was disagreeable.  
Churchill considered the Mediterranean to be a place of special importance to the British cause.  The 
Aegean theatre was nearly exclusively British and Greece became a particular point of emphasis.  
Roosevelt had adopted a measured hands-off policy, and thus apparently relented when Churchill, in 
a responding letter, expressed doubts 
about Donovan’s use in the 
Balkans.75  
Churchill had his own plans, 
which he put into action without 
discussion with Roosevelt.  Churchill 
did not see the purpose of sending 
Donovan to the Četniks.  He was 
ready to at least examine the possible 
utility of an agreement with Tito and 
another allied mission to Mihailović appeared redundant.  Churchill made his move in May 1943.  
F.W. Deakin, an Oxford man and former literary partner of Churchill’s, was dropped into 
Yugoslavia.  Churchill, hoping Yugoslavia could continue to tie down multiple German divisions, 
decided to put politics aside and turn to “the question of obtaining the best results from local 
resistance to the Axis in Yugoslavia.”76  Deakin landed in Yugoslavia at Tito’s headquarters near the 
mountain of Durmitor in Montenegro.  Deakin was a working in a new capacity as a member of the 
newly formed Special Operations Executive or SOE.  The SOE and their American Counterparts, the 
OSS, were precursors of today’s CIA and MI6.  These organizations served many purposes, but their 
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primary use was covert intelligence activity.  Deakin defined the purpose of the SOE: “to organize 
and aid resistance in occupied Europe and to collect intelligence regarding the enemy wherever 
contact with resistance elements could be made.”77   
Deakin and his associates who made first contact with the Partisans were intended to determine 
the merits of the Partisan movement and ascertain whether a more focused mission should follow.  
Deakin was in doubt about the British aims within Yugoslavia.  Did the British intend a split 
Yugoslavia with a Tito led Croatia and a Royalist Serbia or was the mission in fact as it appeared, a 
fact – finding venture?  Deakin admitted that Mihailović, to this point, had received support both in 
terms of propaganda and military aid, but why now the focus on the Partisan movement that had been 
continually scorned?78  Their mission, as Deakin put it, was “a thinly disguised task of espionage to 
asses the aims and military strength of the Partisan movement,” along with performing a rudimentary 
task of comparison between Četnik and Partisan activity level, location, and strength.79  While 
Deakin and his men had no means of direct comparison as they remained out of contact with the 
mission to Mihailović, they were able to attest to the ceaseless Partisan resistance.  Deakin fought 
alongside the Partisans and was able to accurately describe Partisan positions and strength to the SOE 
office in Cairo and then subsequently to Churchill himself. 
The success of the Deakin mission bred further British interest in aid and reconnaissance 
concerning the Partisans.  Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean was selected in late July 1943 to head a more 
complete mission with both American OSS officers and British SOE officers.  Maclean had already 
experienced much by summer, 1943.  As a member of the British consulate to Moscow during the 
Stalinist purges of the late 1930’s, Maclean understood both the value and danger of revolutionary 
Communism as it had been put into practice.  When approached to lead the mission to Tito, Maclean 
had his doubts about cavorting with Communists as he understood the aggressive, expansionist 
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policy of the Comintern and 
Stalinist Russia.  Churchill’s 
response to his doubts was 
simple.  Churchill told him that as 
long “as the whole of Western 
civilization was threatened by the 
Nazi menace, we could not afford 
to let our attention be diverted 
from the immediate issue by 
considerations of long-term 
policy…Now, in the light of what 
the prime minister told me, my 
position was clear.”80  This was a 
critical point of distinction that 
now must appear obvious 
following the change in 
Churchill’s stance.  At least generally, Churchill was concerned first with victory.  There are a few 
exceptions, markedly Greece and policy in the Aegean, but Churchill pointed out to Maclean that the 
focus was to determine who was making the most headway and doing the most damage against the 
enemy and thus to determine who was most worthy of support and aid.  Maclean’s task, simply put, 
was “to find out who was killing the most Germans and suggest means by which we could help them 
kill more.  Politics was a secondary consideration.”81  The concept was brilliantly simple, but equally 
demonstrative of the priorities of British involvement in Yugoslavia in the last years of the war.  
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As Deakin before him, Maclean fought side by side with Partisan soldiers and returned glowing 
evaluations of Partisan strength.  This prompted Churchill to write to Marshal Tito for the first time 
on January 8th of 1944.  Churchill thanked Tito for his effort and promised additional aid from all of 
the Big Three, but he most importantly set out his policy for the last year of the war in Yugoslavia.  
Churchill writes that,  
“I am resolved that the British government will give no further military support 
to Mihailović and will only give help to you, and we should be glad if the Royal 
Yugoslavian government would dismiss him from their councils… It would not 
be chivalrous or honorable for the British government to cast (King Peter) 
aside.  Nor can we ask him to cut all his existing contacts with his country.  I 
hope therefore that you will understand we shall in any case remain in official 
relations with him while at the same time giving you all possible military 
support. I hope also that there may be an end to politics on either side, for these 
only help the Germans.”82 
This letter was significant in many ways.  First and clearly evident, Mihailović had been finally 
scorned by Churchill.  He had made the final decision to pull support from the Četniks (a decision he 
would follow through with in February of that same year), but still remained politically committed to 
the official government in London.  Churchill also informed Tito that “at your headquarters will soon 
be serving my son, Major Randolph Churchill.”83  While Tito seemed to be Churchill’s chosen 
general, King Peter remained the respected leader.  This was Churchill’s compromise.  Peter would 
be allowed to return to Yugoslavia and Tito would need to accommodate a bipartisan government 
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sensitive to the needs of all Yugoslavians.  Dr. Ivan Šubašić was selected with the approval of both 
Western leaders as Ban of Croatia to broker an equitable deal between Tito and the King.84 
 Churchill now appeared committed to Tito, but what factors influenced his decision?  Colonel 
Bailey’s report of Mihailović’s priorities was damaging, but there were other concerns.  Churchill 
thought him too inactive and reports were surfacing in 1943 of collaboration with Germans and 
Italians.85  Mihailović almost certainly collaborated with the Italians and perhaps some of his 
regional commanders accepted a degree of mutual accommodation with the Germans, but we must 
recall that his priorities centered on the protection of his country from internal dangers first and 
external threats second.  In fairness, we are certain that Tito sent Milovan Djilas and a few other 
emissaries to hold negations with the Germans in March of 1943 and the interaction was well 
documented.86  The third primary reason following accused inactivity and collaboration was the 
glowing evaluations that the liaison officers returned of the Partisans.  The stories of their heroism in 
comparison to what Bailey and Hudson could report of the Četniks helped persuade Churchill that a 
change might be needed.  There were other reasons at work behind the scenes as well. 
 Churchill might have conveyed to Brigadier Maclean that the Allies were forsaking long-term 
goals for the short-term priority of victory over the Nazis, but by late 1944, the fate of the war was 
beginning to crystallize.  Attention needed to be paid to post-war arrangements, particularly in the 
jumbled mass of Eastern Europe.  Churchill and Stalin met in the Kremlin at 10 PM on the night of 
October 9th, 1944 and decided the spheres of influence that would govern European politics for the 
ensuing half-century.   Churchill acquiesced on the issue of Rumania, Poland, and Bulgaria which 
were all under some form of Soviet occupation and, in turn, Stalin agreed to abandon the Greek 
Communists and allow Greece and Churchill’s much desired Aegean to fall under British influence.  
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The so called percentages agreement defined influence in Yugoslavia as 50/50.87  The meaning of a 
50/50 share of influence is ambiguous, but clearly it did mean that neither West nor East alone would 
have the luxury of deciding the fate of a nation.  Yugoslavia was to answer its own national question, 
and thus the strong were most aptly positioned to seize power when the dust settled.  Regardless of 
association, Tito was doubtless the strongest contender as the war began to end in Yugoslavia in 
1944, and Churchill would not 
step in to push the stronger man 
from power. 
B. The Press Reacts 
The change in the Western 
Press was curious over the course 
of the war.  When Mihailović was 
the only option, he was the hero 
of Yugoslavia.  When the 
Partisans emerged onto the scene, 
Mihailović remained favored 
though mutterings of dissent 
slowly began to emerge.  By the end of 1943 into 1944 when it became clear that Tito would be the 
chosen military champion of the Western allies within Yugoslavia, those mutterings of dissent 
became more pronounced.  Those who favored Mihailović continued to argue in his favor, but the 
press as a whole moved with the official stance of the Western governments into the camp of 
Marshal Tito.  Bogdan Raditsa, a Croatian-American freelance journalist, writing for The Nation, 
introduced the Partisans to the American people in October of 1943.  Raditsa claimed that the 
Partisans were more qualified to lead the nation and had more extensive popular support while 
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stamping Mihailović with the stigma of being obsolete.  Mihailović was “the last representative of 
the Chetnik warriors during the nineteenth century...But he is also a product of still older Serbian 
traditions…This spirit is too static for today, when the Yugoslav people are fighting for a new and 
better world.”88  This argument for Tito and his Partisans as the more qualified the leaders of a now 
ever more clouded situation in post-war Yugoslavia was a marked departure from earlier arguments.  
Andre Visson wrote in The Washington Post in January of that same year that the first major test case 
for United Nations post-war reorganization would be Yugoslavia.  Visson tied the Partisans 
inexorably with Soviet Russia and claimed that Mihailović and the rightful ruler in exile should be 
restored to guarantee peace and stability.89  The British press, with their leader so solidly behind Tito, 
stood with him in favor of Tito’s government.  A correspondent in the Times lamented Tito’s lack of 
recognition by the official government.  He wrote, “General Mihailovich, whose recent attitude has 
been inactive and ambiguous, has seen fit to keep up his feud against General Tito’s Partisans…It is 
even more regrettable that the Yugoslav government in Cairo…should have denied any 
representative quality to General Tito’s delegates and to his Government.”90 
Clearly a change had come about in how the Western press was evaluating the merits of the two 
contrasting forces within Yugoslavia, but a more apt question would be why?  Why did this change 
occur?  As previously mentioned, much of the attitude of the Western press corresponded with the 
attitude of the Western governments.  Churchill had clearly, emphatically and publicly, chosen his 
champion, but what of Roosevelt? As mentioned, Roosevelt had generally relinquished the Balkans 
and the theatre in the Aegean to Churchill but for a few incursions in policy.  Roosevelt had 
suggested that OSS head Brigadier General Donovan lead an allied mission to Mihailović in 1943 but 
had apparently acquiesced to Churchill’s veto.  In reality, Roosevelt did send Donovan to Yugoslavia 
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as head of a solely American liaison party to Mihailović.  When Churchill caught wind of this 
mission as late as September of 1944, he was displeased and responded.  He wrote back to the 
President, “We are endeavoring to give Tito support and, of course, if the United States, backs 
Mihailovic, complete chaos will ensue…if we each back different sides, we lay the scene for a fine 
civil war.”91  Churchill also claimed that Donovan was “running a strong Mihailović lobby, just when 
we have persuaded King Peter to break decisively with him and when many of the Četniks are being 
rallied under Tito.”92  Roosevelt responded two days later promising to remove Donovan and his 
mission which had been founded under the legitimate purpose of evacuating downed American 
flyers.93  Though he agreed to withdraw his mission, Roosevelt obviously remained unconvinced 
about the merits of supporting Tito over the previously lionized Mihailović.   
Clearly Roosevelt harbored doubts, but he did not act upon those doubts publicly.  The Donovan 
snafu was not an issue, and Roosevelt never publicly denounced Churchill’s selected course of 
action.  More than Roosevelt’s silence on the matter, the more outspoken voices of other politicians 
may have swayed the perception of Yugoslavia among the members of the press and the general 
public.  Monrad Wallgren graduated from the Washington State School of Optometry in 1915 and 
practiced in the State of Washington before running for and winning a seat in the US House in 1932.  
Wallgren succeeded a retiring Senator in 1940 and served in the US Senate as a Democrat from 1940 
until 1945, then as governor of Washington State from 1945 until 1949.  Wallgren spoke out on May 
23rd, 1944 on the floor of the Senate, voicing his opinion on the conflict in Yugoslavia.  He proposed 
a drastic step.  Wallgren asked the United States government to follow the lead of Brazil and freeze 
the assets of the Royal government of Yugoslavia.94  Wallgren argued that leaving the money 
available would fund Mihailović’s war effort which Wallgren claimed was a collaborationist effort. 
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He favored apportioning more money for military and medical aid to Marshal Tito who he called  
“the George Washington of Yugoslavia.”95  Such venomous condemnations by a leader in our 
nation’s highest governing body no doubt swayed many to the side of the new Eagle of Yugoslavia, 
Marshal Tito. 
Perhaps there was an even more plain reason why coverage remained so biased toward 
Mihailović in the mainstream Western press until late in 1943 into 1944.  The accusation of United 
Nations and government censorship was not uncommon.  Joseph Harrison, the Middle East war 
correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, was one such journalist who claimed to have been 
censored in the earlier years of the war.  Harrison, writing in March 1944, wrote that there had been a 
marked change in allied opinion surrounding General Mihailović in recent weeks.  Now newspaper 
reporters, wiring their stories through Allied command in Cairo, were “permitted to use the word 
‘Chetnik’ to describe the Mihailovic Guerillas accused of attacks upon Partisan forces.”96 Harrison 
wrote further that, “Despite the fact that Partisans have been speaking of these attacks for many 
months, we have been unable to mention them from here due to Allied concern for the feeling of the 
Yugoslav government in exile.”97  It was Harrison’s belief that this easing of the censorship 
symbolized a wish for broader publicity among Allied leaders for the Partisans and a movement 
away from the Royal Government of Yugoslavia.  In a similar claim, an Associated Press reporter 
claimed that portions of an AP interview with Tito had been removed when he began to criticize 
Mihailović.  The reasoning for the censorship was first, a protection of confidential military 
information and second, a desire to prevent Tito from using popular pressure against Allied policy.98   
There were, at times, quite legitimate reasons to prevent the imbedded press corps from simply 
writing whatever they pleased.  These concerns were primarily military in nature, but this evidence of 
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political censorship also showed an effort to control perception through a tight watch on the stories 
written by press correspondents on the ground.  The greater implication of this evidence is that 
perhaps the press had been pro-Tito since his emergence in 1942 onto the global stage or at least a 
number of them had decided in favor of the Partisans before Churchill.  At least these examples show 
that some correspondents would have been willing to write stories in favor of Tito some time before 
the censorship was lifted.  Regardless, by summer 1944, Tito had supplanted Mihailović nearly 
completely as the darling of the Western 
press.   
Not everyone was toeing the line 
drawn by Churchill.  One group in 
particular was outspoken in favor of the 
Četnik leader.  We must recall that 
Roosevelt claimed that one of the purposes 
of the Donovan mission in 1943 was to 
evacuate downed American airmen.  This 
was no farce as many airmen were rescued 
with the help of Četniks on the ground.  
These evacuated airmen were quite vigorous advocates of additional aid for Mihailović once they 
returned home.99  Despite these smatterings of support, Mihailović and the leaders of the Royal 
Yugoslav Government were beginning to recognize that they were no longer the darlings of the 
Western press.  Captain Borislav Todorovitch, an officer under Mihailović, was sent to Washington 
to meet with the press and lobby the government to provide more material aid.   Todorovitch accused 
the Partisans of Nazi collaboration and claimed they had “conducted a reign of terror by killing 
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prominent peasants and burning property in villages,” and he further claimed that, “The partisans 
were 90 percent Communists bent upon furthering their ideology.”100  Todorovitch was clearly a 
political lobbyist, but his words demonstrate how deep the rift had become in Yugoslavia and what a 
difficult task lay ahead for the Western leaders if 
they hoped to glue the country back together.  
Churchill would use the newly appointed Ban of 
Croatia, Dr. Ivan Šubašić, to bridge the growing 
gap between Tito and the King Peter and craft a 
post-war Yugoslavia that could be equitable for 
all. 
By 1944, Tito and AVNOJ had been moved 
by the British to a more secure location on the 
offshore island of Vis along the Dalmatian coast.  
Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean had worked with outside British aid to establish a more secure location for 
the Partisan leadership as they had experienced a number of dangerous situations while stationed 
throughout Bosnia.  There Tito was more accessible to the Western governments and traveled to 
meet Churchill in mainland Italy.  It was during this time of increased exposure that Šubašić began 
his efforts to broker a deal between Tito and King Peter.  Šubašić was successful and the Tito – 
Šubašić agreement was a landmark for the legitimacy of Tito as a leader of Yugoslavia.   The 
agreement was simple.  Tito would lead the military and King Peter would head a new, mutually 
agreed upon ruling cabinet.  This agreement would prevail until the war was over and a plebiscite 
would be held following the war to determine what the public desired in the form of a post-war 
government.  Time magazine reported the Tito – Šubašić agreement and its implications in July of 
1944 and astutely suggested a major issue with the rise of ethnically Croatian Josip Broz Tito and 
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Ivan Šubašić.  The Serbian people and their hero Mihailović appeared almost utterly left out and 
forgotten.  Time wrote that “Winston Churchill had truly said that the Serbian problem could not 
be dismissed by dismissing Draja Mihailovich. Yugoslavia's chances for permanent unity still 
depend on the new Government's success in dealing with the proud, tough Serbs of Serbia.”101 
Tito understood what his task would be should he be able to solidify his power following the 
war, and he was prepared to undertake the necessary measures to secure his position.  
Yugoslavia was generally liberated by mid 1944 with one primary exception.  The major 
cities, particularly Belgrade, remained protected by entrenched German armor.  The Partisan 
guerillas, though effective in their deadly art of ambush and rural warfare, were ill equipped and 
unprepared to confront the German armor that protected the major cities, islands in a sea of 
chaos for the German military.  Tito understood that he could not expect aid of the kind needed 
to accomplish his goals of completed liberation from the Americans or British.  The Soviets, 
however, were pressing swiftly through Eastern Europe preparing to batter down the doors of the 
German homeland.  Tito understood that asking Stalin for aid was dangerous.  Stalin was already 
in preparation for the post-war era, with leaders ready for the liberated nations.  With Rakosi in 
Hungary, Beirut in Poland, and Ulrich in Germany, Stalin used liberation as a pretext for forced 
restructuring.  With these reservations, Tito disappeared from Vis in September of 1944.  Tito 
met with Stalin in Moscow without the knowledge or consent of the Western Allied leaders.  
There he and Stalin agreed exactly how far into Yugoslavia Soviet forces would be allowed to 
penetrate and how long they would be permitted to remain.  They would press in only to liberate 
the cities from the German armor with Partisan support and immediately withdraw leaving few if 
any men as a garrison.102  In this way Tito maintained his political and military autonomy while 
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still making use of Soviet might to allow him to liberate his nation.  Tito understood Stalin’s 
plans for Eastern Europe following the war and was eager to secure his own post-war 
sovereignty and independence from Red Army 
occupation. 
Stalin, having left Tito much to his own devices 
early in the war, had been running a strong pro-Tito 
lobby since 1943.  Radio Free Yugoslavia from the 
Urals was one example of pro-Partisan propaganda.  In 
May of 1944, Time reported Stalin’s statements in 
favor of Tito and his Partisans.  Stalin said that “It is 
high time . . . the Governments of the United Nations 
broke off diplomatic relations with the bankrupt group 
of Yugoslav officials and police in Cairo who 
represent nobody but themselves. It is high time to recognize [Tito's] Government.”103  Stalin 
also argued to Churchill in favor of the Partisans in private correspondence in 1943 in which he 
argued that ”I find it difficult even to point to the difference between the Émigré government of 
Poland and the similar Émigré government of Yugoslavia, or between certain Generals of the 
Polish Émigré government and the Serbian General Mikhailovich.”104 Stalin considered the 
Yugoslavian Royal Government out of touch and their chosen champion unworthy of continued 
Allied support. Tito needed Stalin’s aid, but he avoided any concrete relationship or association 
because Tito was not prepared to answer to Stalin in the post-war arrangement of Eastern 
Europe.  Tito planned to govern his own nation autonomously, and he needed to remove any 
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threat to the stability that he hoped to forge.  What internal factors could threaten him?  Peter had 
been neutralized for all intents and purposes, but the “Eagle of Yugoslavia,” the hero of the first 
years of the war and champion of Serbia, Draža Mihailović remained.  Tito was gained absolute 
power for all intents and purposes (whether legitimately or not) in the post-war plebiscite and 
established the Federal Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia.  Mihailović was already in hiding, 
realizing the futility of continued resistance against the new regime.  He was captured on March 
13th, 1946 and prepared to stand trial for his supposed war crimes.   
V. Conclusion 
A. Topčider Infantry Academy, Belgrade, July 15th, 1946 
 Draža Mihailović stood 
to speak on his own behalf 
for the first time on July 
10th.  Having endured 
countless sessions of 
examination by the state 
military prosecuter Miloš  
Minić and endured his 
stinging closing argument, 
he was spent.  He spoke for four hours in his own defense, pleading with the military tribunal to 
examine the evidence justly.  He said, “I believed I was on the right road, but fate was merciless to 
me when it threw me into this maelstrom.  I wanted much, I started much, but the gale of the world 
carried away me and my work.”105 He attempted to justify the anti-Yugoslav actions and 
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collaboration he was accused of having engaged in, but it was to no avail.  Just five days later, on 
July 15th, he was sentenced to death by firing squad, a sentence which was carried out three days later 
after the rejection of an appeal for clemency.  For better or worse for Yugoslavia, Draža Mihailović 
was gone and Tito would decide the fate of the nation.   
The reaction in Britain was measured, but in the United States, many news outlets were skeptical 
of the charges and the methods used by the prosecution.  Time’s appraisal was perhaps most astute, 
writing that, “To millions who remembered his early heroism, his rescue of US and British flyers, it 
was hard to believe Mihailovich a traitor.  What, then, was he guilty of? … When the US and Britain 
threw their support to Tito, Mihailovich, too weak or too weary to control his subordinates, turned 
more & more to collaboration.  His major crime – unpardonable in war and politics – was failure.”106  
The American government made available some of the airmen who had been rescued by the Četnik 
guerillas to testify, but the Yugoslavian government under Tito would not allow it.  Truman also 
awarded  Mihailović posthumously a legion of merit medal in recognition of his wartime valor, but 
the United States provided him little real help in his time of need and Britain less.  The half-hearted 
efforts of the U.S. government to aid their once heralded ally were perhaps indicative of those doubts 
that Roosevelt had harbored concerning the decision to aid Tito.  Alex Dragnich, a professor of 
Political Science at Western Reserve University, wrote an appraisal of the trial in Current History 
magazine.   Dragnich offered both an appraisal of the American attitude of the trial and an idea of 
why Mihailović ultimately failed in his endeavors.  He wrote, “We had supported Mikhailovitch 
early and our shift to Tito was grudgingly made.  We followed Great Britain with great reluctance in 
abandoning Mikahilovitch.  Many Americans regretted and opposed our course.  To them the State 
Department apparently felt indebted to [offer to send witnesses on behalf of Mihailović].”107  
Dragnich claims that Mihailović’s main error was that, “he allowed himself to become a tool of the 
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discredited politicians in the Yugoslav government-in-exile, who were of the same political hue as 
the more immediate advisors surrounding him…There is reason to believe that he was personally 
honest, but politically immature.”108   
This seemed to be a quite accurate assessment.  Mihailović became associated with a dying 
governing body hundreds of miles away and, while Tito was winning by attrition, Mihailović was 
betrayed by his own personal concern for his people.  Mihailović did not understand the priorities of 
the Western leadership or comprehend the impact that a loss of Western support could have on his 
guerilla movement.  Mihailović became associated with the old and the antiquated while Tito was the 
face a new age in Yugoslavia.  The old Yugoslavia died when Draža Mihailović was executed.  Only 
he had the clout to reestablish a crumbling regime and provide it legitimacy on the international 
stage.  With his death, Tito knew his future and that of a Communist Yugoslavia would become 
secure.  There would be no conflict of opinion as to who 
the true war hero of Yugoslavia was, at least not openly, 
and the fateful but gradual decision to abandon 
Mihailović in favor of Tito coupled with his support in 
the Western press made this reality possible. 
B. Conclusion and Perspective 
 On May 8th, 1980, thousands gathered to see the 
man who had led Yugoslavia for nearly forty years be 
laid to rest.  Leaders from over one hundred nations 
witnessed the end of what was the most stable era to date 
in the Yugoslav Republics.  Just a decade later, the nation that Tito had built collapsed in the 
bloodiest, most ethnically charged conflict since 1945 in Europe.  The Second World War allowed 
Yugoslavia to decide its own national question in a way that it had been unable to do during its brief 
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democratic experiment of the early 1920’s.  Tito unified and held together a nation that had simply 
compromised on ethnic issues in favor of mutual survival.  The Second World War bred ethnic 
cooperation in some ways, but in other ways, Tito’s rise to power built the foundation of the later 
Wars of Yugoslav Succession.  When Slobodan Milošević rose to prominence in Serbia during the 
early 1990’s, he demanded more Serbian power and autonomy.  Milošević claimed that the Serbs had 
been slighted during the preceding decades and deserved their rightful place as the preeminent ethnic 
group among the south Slavs.  Mihailović’s failure was devastating to the Serbian people because it 
guaranteed that they would lose their position of power.  Tito ushered in an era of ethnic cooperation, 
but the Serbs received the smallest proportional share of power. Maurice Western wrote in the 
Canadian foreign affairs magazine International Journal in 1946 that “All nationalities were 
represented in (Tito’s) cabinet, but, while there were many Serbs…they were not “Serbs from 
Serbia” – an important distinction to Belgrade critics.”109  The Serbs felt betrayed by the Western 
leaders and frustrated that their champion had been scorned.  The ripples of Mihailović’s defeat 
spread for years to come in Yugoslavia and would be used as justification for war and genocide in 
what is now the former Yugoslavia. 
 Michael Lees published a retrospective look at Tito’s movement into prominence in 1990 which 
he entitled The Rape of Serbia.110  This book, along with David Martin’s Web of Disinformation,111 
both claimed that Churchill’s decision to abandon Mihailović was based on faulty intelligence and 
biased liaison officers.  David Martin has been arguing in favor of Mihailović for years now, 
publishing multiple books, but both men expressed doubts common in modern scholarship about the 
correctness of Churchill’s decision.  Did Churchill’s decision really amount to the “Rape of Serbia” 
and was it based on faulty information?  Probably to a degree, but that is difficult to know for sure.  
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His decision clearly had a major, decisive impact on the future of post-war Yugoslavia.  Whether 
correct or misled, Churchill influenced the course of European politics as well as the perception of 
Tito and Mihailović in the British and American public.  The real post war danger was, as Maurice 
Western wrote, that “The instinct for liberty is as deep in the South Slav nations as it is anywhere, but 
idealists can often be led down the garden path…How it will eventually go, it is much too soon to 
predict.”112   
 Regardless of the future consequences, Josip Broz Tito had been given the right to guide the fate 
of a battered and broken nation in the way that he chose.  The conflict of ideology, of methodology, 
and of priorities between Mihailović and Tito had been decided thanks in no small part to the role of 
the Western governments and public in the development of the conflict.  Of the two contrasting 
journeys, only one would continue on.  The other would die with the old Yugoslavia that he loved.  
Unfortunately for Draža Mihailović, he aligned himself with the dying part of Yugoslavia and a 
dying institution in general, the monarchy.  The monarchy had become insignificant, in part because 
of its failure to establish stability during the inter-war period and in part because of the weakness 
Peter showed during the war itself.  Mihailović was always fighting an uphill battle, attempting to 
defend a dying institution against the popular winds of revolutionary change that Tito represented.  
Perhaps only an Allied landing in the Balkans could have salvaged victory for Mihailović, but both 
Roosevelt and Stalin were opposed and Churchill abandoned this course of action quite early.113 
Victory was for Mihailović not an impossibility, at least in the short run, but in the long run, defeat 
was perhaps an inevitability.  Tito would not be a member of the Communist bloc in like mind with 
the other nations of Eastern Europe.  He would not join the Warsaw pact and clashed with both Stalin 
and Khrushchev in the coming years, but neither would Tito join NATO and the Western camp.  
Tito, as during the war, would remain fiercely independent, a man of resolve and ambition. We can 
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never know, however, how Draža Mihailović would have led his nation had he emerged victorious.  
For better or for worse, Yugoslavia was Tito’s to lead.  
 Winston Churchill, bereft of office due to the pitfalls of a parliamentary system, delivered a 
speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on March 5th, 1946.  He famously said, “From 
Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent.”114  
With Trieste, he referred to Yugoslavia and the city that Tito was reluctant to relinquish to the 
Italians.  He spoke of Tito in a less than positive tone, perhaps understanding the consequences of 
accepting post-war complications for wartime utility.  The guerilla war in Yugoslavia was a 
polarizing topic during the war and remains a polarizing topic today, both inside and outside of the 
former Yugoslav republics.  What began as a grassroots effort to resist those who would occupy their 
homeland became a political struggle that embroiled world leaders and influenced the hearts and 
minds of average citizens in the West.  The impact of the Western leaders’ decisions was great on the 
Western press and its coverage of the conflict, but it was even greater on the actual conflict in 
Yugoslavia.  The war changed a nation, and the decisions of the leaders of the Western Allies shaped 
the future of the turbulent Balkans and helped to decide the fate of two men who, though 
ideologically opposed, were united by a common love of their homeland and belief that they could 
unite, rebuild, and restore a nation and the many people that called it home.  
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